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1 Introduction
Nash (1950a,b) proves existence of mixed strategy equilibria in …nite games. Follow-
ing von Neumann and Morgenstern (1947) Nash presumes, …rst, that a player’s best
response can be described as a preference maximizing choice over a set of lotteries,
and second, that these preferences are representable by an expected utility functional.
Subsequently, several non-expected utility models of decision making have been devel-
oped either motivated by plausibility considerations (e.g., lexicographic expected utility
theory in Hausner, 1954), or by observed violations of expected utility theory in experi-
mental situations of decision making (e.g., Allais, 1953; Ellsberg, 1961; for an overview
see, e.g., Karni and Schmeidler, 1991; Starmer, 2000; Schmidt, 2003).
This paper explores existence of equilibria and existence of rationalizable strategies
(Bernheim, 1984; Moulin, 1984; Pearce, 1984), in …nite games with mixed strategy sets
under the assumption that players’ best responses are described as preference maxi-
mizing choices of lotteries1 such that players have so-called security and potential level
preferences (Gilboa, 1988; Ja¤ray, 1988; Cohen, 1992; Essid, 1997; Schmidt and Zimper,
2003). Models of security and potential level preferences are generalizations of expected
utility theory that explain Allais paradoxa by discontinuities in preferences arising from
di¤erent security- or potential levels associated with lotteries. My investigation adopts
Cohen’s (1992) approach who de…nes a lottery’s security level as worst and its potential
level as best outcome in the lottery’s support. According to this approach a security e¤ect
describes a discontinuous upward jump in a lottery’s utility evaluation if the probability
of a bad outcome drops to zero. Similarly, a potential e¤ect describes a discontinuous
downward jump in case the probability of a good outcome drops to zero.
Crawford (1990) also investigates existence of equilibria in …nite games for players
with non-expected utility preferences over lotteries. He shows that, although mixed
strategy Nash equilibria may not exist in …nite games, existence of so-called equilibria in
beliefs can be established if players’ preferences are representable by continuous utility
functions. Key to Crawford’s result is the observation that existence of Nash equilib-
ria only fails for continuous utility functions if the best response correspondence is not
convex-valued (which may be the case for randomization-averse players). Since an equi-
librium in beliefs is de…ned as a …xed point of a convex-valued beliefs over best-responses
correspondence, equilibria in beliefs exist for all continuously representable non-expected
1Game theoretic models applying non-expected utility theories of choice under uncertainty, thereby
reacting to paradoxa of the Ellsberg-type, assume either non-additive beliefs, i.e., capacities, (Dow and
Werlang, 1994, Ghirardato and Le Breton, 1997 and 2000; Eichberger and Kelsey, 2000) based on
Schmeidler (1989); or multi-prior models (Lo, 1995, Klibano¤, 1996) based on Gilboa and Schmeidler
(1989).
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utility preferences.
For players with security- and potential preferences, so-called SL,PL-players, the
resulting discontinuous utility representation prevents an application of Crawford’s exis-
tence results. Moreover, results of Dasgupta and Maskin (1989) establishing existence of
Nash equilibria for discontinuous utility functions are not applicable either. This paper
…rst proves the existence of rationalizable strategies - despite possible non-existence of
best responses to some beliefs. Second, this paper shows that equilibria, even de…ned as
equilibria in beliefs, may not exist for games with SL,PL-players. A third result states
conditions implying existence of Nash equilibria in mixed strategies under the assump-
tion that only potential but no security e¤ects occur. This existence result is technically
interesting because it guarantees existence of a …xed point under conditions preventing
an application of Kakutani’s …xed point theorem. Finally, existence of trembling hand
perfect equilibria (Selten, 1975) and of proper equilibria (Myerson, 1978) is demonstrated.
However, since these equilibria are not necessarily Nash equilibria, this existence result
is, in my opinion, only of limited value.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 motivates security-
and potential level preferences. Section 3 recalls Cohen’s (1992) utility representation of
security- and potential level preferences, and section 4 lists relevant technical properties
of security- and potential level preferences. Section 5 introduces SL,PL-players to …nite
games with mixed-strategy sets. Existence of rationalizable strategies in games with
SL,PL-players is proved in section 6. Section 7 demonstrates possible non-existence of
equilibria in beliefs. Furthermore, a restricted existence result for Nash equilibria in
mixed-strategies is presented. Section 8 shows and interprets the existence of trembling
hand perfect equilibria (Selten, 1975) and of proper equilibria (Myerson, 1978) in games
with SL,PL-players regardless whether Nash equilibria exist or not. Section 9 concludes.
Formal proofs are relegated to the appendix.
2 Security- and Potential Level Preferences: A Mo-
tivating Example
A well-known study on the psychology of decision making under risk by Lopes (1987)
identi…es three di¤erent factors a decision maker takes into account when evaluating
lotteries: the expected utility of a lottery, the worst possible outcome of a lottery,
i.e., the lottery’s security level, and the best possible outcome of a lottery, i.e., the
lottery’s potential level. This conclusion motivated Cohen (1992) to develop a three-
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criteria decision model which generalizes expected utility by allowing for security level
and potential level considerations.
Essid (1997) generalizes Cohen’s model to non-…nite outcome sets. Schmidt and
Zimper (2003) introduce possible thresholds in the perception of security- and potential
levels such that a small likelihood of a bad or of a good outcome does not necessarily
in‡uence the security, respectively potential, level of a lottery. Earlier models of Gilboa
(1988) and Ja¤ray (1988) are very similar to Cohen’s model but restrict attention to
the security level alone. In contrast to alternative generalizations of expected utility
theory, e.g., models with the betweenness-property (e.g., Chew, 1989; Gul, 1991), or
models of rank dependent utility (e.g., Quiggin, 1982; Green and Julien, 1989; Segal,
1989 and 1993; Quiggin and Wakker, 1994), all security- and potential level models
explain Allais paradoxa by discontinuities of preferences resulting from the di¤erent
security- and potential levels of the lotteries involved.
In what follows a choice situation is described such that plausible preferences can
be accommodated by security- and potential level models but not by any alternative
generalization of expected utility theory I am aware of.
Consider a pre-emptive strike decision situation such that decision maker B may ei-
ther destroy or distribute weapons of mass destruction in the nearer future while decision
maker A can either keep peace or wage war in order to prevent distribution of WMD.
Assume the following payo¤s of A
A
B will destroy B will distribute
peace 2 0
war 1 1
Suppose that A very strongly evaluates security such that she does not take any
chances, that is, she strictly prefers war to peace whenever she believes there is a positive
chance that B will distribute, i.e., for all ¯ > 0
1 ¢ 1 ÂA (1¡ ¯) ¢ 2 © ¯ ¢ 0 (1)
where ¯ 2 [0; 1] denotes A’s belief that B will distribute. These preferences are not
representable by any continuous utility function. However, they can be represented by
lexicographic expected utility theory (Hausner, 1954) as well as by security- and potential
level models.
Now extend this pre-emptive strike decision situation by assuming that A somehow
becomes aware of the possibility that B did already distribute WMD.
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AB will destroy B will distribute B did already distribute
peace 2 0 0
war 1 1 0
Suppose then A believes with chance 0.1 B did already distribute WMD, whereas the
perceived chances that B will distribute, (respectively destroy), are 0.09, (respectively
0.81). Given these beliefs, A prefers peace if and only if
0:81 ¢ 2© 0:19 ¢ 0 ºA 0:9 ¢ 1© 0:1 ¢ 0 (2)
Under this situation, preferring peace while at the same time having preferences sat-
isfying (1), an Allais paradox is committed by violation of the so-called independence
axiom. To see this, substitute ¯ = 0:9 in (1) and rewrite (2) to obtain
1 ¢ 1 Â A0:9 ¢ 2 © 0:1 ¢ 0
0:9 ¢ (0:9 ¢ 2 © 0:1 ¢ 0) © 0:1 ¢ 0 º A0:9 ¢ (1 ¢ 1)© 0:1 ¢ 0
Allais paradoxa are very common deviations from expected utility theory in exper-
imental situations of decision making under risk. In contrast to lexicographic expected
utility theory, security- and potential level models may be able to accommodate Allais
paradoxa because they do not have to satisfy the independence axiom.
To sum up, preferences satisfying (1) and (2) are neither representable by continuous
non-expected utility theories nor by lexicographic expected utility theory. Are these
preferences plausible? Yes, since they just presume decision makers who do not take
chances and who commit Allais paradoxa. In the following section it is demonstrated
how security- and potential level models can easily accommodate preferences satisfying
(1) and (2) by a so-called security e¤ect.
3 Utility Representation of Security- and Potential
Level Preferences
Let X = fx1; :::; xng denote a …nite set of totally ordered deterministic outcomes with
x1 < ::: < xn, and let 4 (X) denote the set of probability distributions, i.e., lotteries,
over X. A lottery ¾ 2 4 (X) is also written as (¾1 ¢ x1 © :::© ¾n ¢ xn) where ¾k denotes
the probability of the realization of outcome xk. Throughout this paper reduction of
compound lotteries is assumed, i.e., a compound lottery (¹ ¢ ¾ © (1 ¡¹) ¢ ¿ ), with ¾; ¿ 2
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4 (X), is considered equivalent to the lottery
(¹¾1 + (1¡ ¹) ¿ 1 ¢ x1 © :::© ¹¾n + (1 ¡¹) ¿n ¢ xn)
Let 4 (x; y) denote the subset of 4 (X) that contains all lotteries ¾ such that x is
the worst and y is the best outcome in the support of ¾, i.e., ¾ 2 4 (x; y) if and only if
x = minSupport (¾) and y = maxSupport (¾). Denote by V :4 (X )£X £X ! R+ a
function such that, for all ¾ 2 4 (X) and all x; y 2 X with x · y,
V (¾; x; y) = b (x; y) + a (x; y)
nX
k=1
¾ (xk)u (xk) (3)
where a : X £ X ! R+, b : X £X ! R+, and u : X ! R+, u (xk+1) > u (xk) for
k = 1; :::; n ¡ 1. The following de…nition of an utility representation for security- and
potential level preferences is equivalent to the utility representation derived in Cohen
(1992) and it reduces to the utility representations of Gilboa (1988) and of Ja¤ray (1988)
if, for all x; y; ¹y 2 X with ¹y ¸ y, b (x; ¹y) = b (x; y) and a(x; ¹y) = a(x; y).2
De…nition: Consider a decision maker with preferences over 4(X) that are repre-
sentable by a utility function U : 4 (X) ! R+ such that, for all ¾ 2 4 (x; y) and all
x; y 2 X with x · y,
U (¾) = V (¾; x; y) (4)
for some function V de…ned by (3). The decision maker has security- and potential
level preferences over 4 (X) if, for all ¾ 2 4(x; y) and all x; y; ¹x; ¹y 2 X with ¹x ¸ x
and ¹y ¸ y,
U (¾) · V (¾; ¹x; ¹y) (5)
Observe thatU (¾) results from adding b (x; y) to the expected utility
Pn
k=1 ¾ (xk) u (xk)
of lottery ¾ multiplied by a (x; y) where the numbers a (x; y) and b (x; y) depend on the
security level x and the potential level y of lottery ¾. Condition (5) assures that the
evaluation of lotteries increases with increasing security- and potential levels and it is,
e.g., satis…ed if, for all x; y; ¹x; ¹y 2 X with ¹x ¸ x and ¹y ¸ y, b (x; y) · b (¹x; ¹y) and
a (x; y) · a (¹x; ¹y).
2On the axiomatic level security- and potential level models assume that the expected utility axioms
remain valid for lotteries with identical security- and potential levels whereas a violation of the inde-
pendence axiom or of the continuity assumption may occur when lotteries with di¤erent security - or
potential levels are involved; (for detailed axiomatic foundations see, e.g., Cohen, 1992; Schmidt and
Zimper, 2003).
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Except for the trivial case where security- and potential preferences reduce to ex-
pected utility preferences, i.e., for all x; y; ¹x; ¹y 2 X with ¹x ¸ x and ¹y ¸ y,
b (¹x; ¹y) = b (x; y) and a (¹x; ¹y) = a (x; y)
the utility representationU is discontinuous. These discontinuities can further be distin-
guished into security- and potential e¤ects. A security e¤ect occurs if there are security
levels ¹x and x, with ¹x > x, such that, for some ¾ 2 4 (x; y),
U (¾) < V (¾; ¹x; y)
That is, if every open neighborhood around a secure lottery ¹¾ 2 4 (¹x; y) contains inse-
cure lotteries ¾ 2 4 (x; y) then there exists some neighborhood around ¹¾ such that ¹¾ is
strictly preferred to all insecure lotteries in this neighborhood.
Accordingly, a potential e¤ect occurs if there are potential levels ¹y and y, with ¹y > y ,
such that, for some ¾ 2 4 (x; y),
U (¾) < V (¾; x; ¹y)
i.e., a low potential lottery ¾ 2 4 (x; y) is inferior to all high potential lotteries ¹¾ 2
4 (x; ¹y) in some neighborhood of ¾.
In the pre-emptive strike decision situation A wants to wage war as long as this
strategy surely avoids the worst-case scenario distribution of WMD. However, once she
comes to believe that the worst-case scenario has already become possible anyway -
independent of her strategy choice - she goes for peace. These preferences are easily
accommodated by assuming a su¢ciently strong security e¤ect: to satisfy condition (1)
and (2) just let u (xk) = xk for xk 2 f0; 1; 2g, and b (x; y) = 0, a (2; y) = a (1; y) = 2,
a (0;y) = 1 for all x; y 2 X with x · y.
4 Properties of Security- and Potential Level Pref-
erences
Speci…c technical properties of security- and potential level preferences are relevant for
the existence of strategic solutions for games with SL,PL-players. Note that security-
and potential level preferences satisfy monotonicity with respect to …rst order stochastic
dominance (see, e.g., Cohen, 1992; Schmidt and Zimper, 2003). That is, for all ¾; ¿ 2
4 (X): U (¾) ¸ U (¿) if F [¾] (x) · F [¿] (x) for all x 2 X where F [¾] denotes the
cumulative distribution function of ¾.
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Quasiconvex utility representations U , i.e., for all ¾; ¿ 2 4(X)
U (¾) > U (¿) ) U (¾) > U (¸ ¢ ¾ © (1¡ ¸) ¢ ¿ ) for ¸ 2 (0; 1)
U (¾) = U (¿) ) U (¾) ¸ U (¸ ¢ ¾ © (1 ¡ ¸) ¢ ¿ ) for ¸ 2 (0; 1)
characterize randomization-averse decision makers. In contrast, quasiconcave U , i.e., for
all ¾; ¿ 2 4 (X)
U (¾) > U (¿ )) U (¸ ¢ ¾ © (1¡ ¸) ¢ ¿ ) > U (¿) for ¸ 2 (0; 1)
U (¾) = U (¿ )) U (¸ ¢ ¾ © (1¡ ¸) ¢ ¿ ) ¸ U (¿) for ¸ 2 (0; 1)
describe randomization-prone decision makers. Recall that quasiconvex utility represen-
tations U may imply non-convex sets
arg max
4(Y )
U with 4 (Y ) ½ 4 (X ) (6)
of utility maximizing lotteries, which is not the case for quasiconcave U .
Further, recall that upper-semicontinuous U , i.e., for all sequences f¾ngn2N ½ 4 (X)
such that limn!1¾n = ¾
lim sup
n!1
U (¾n) · U (¾)
imply non-empty sets (6) of utility maximizing lotteries for all compact 4 (Y ) ½ 4 (X ),
4 (Y ) 6= ;. In contrast, lower-semicontinuity of U , i.e., for all sequences f¾ngn2N ½
4 (X) such that limn!1 ¾n = ¾
lim inf
n!1U (¾n) ¸ U (¾)
might induce empty sets (6) of utility maximizing lotteries for compact 4 (Y ) ½ 4 (X ),
4 (Y ) 6= ;.
The following properties of Cohen’s (1992) utility representation for security- and
potential level preferences are easily veri…ed.
Observation 1.
If there do not occur any potential e¤ects then U is quasiconvex and upper-semicontinuous.
If there do not occur any security e¤ects then U is quasiconcave and lower-semicontinuous.
For example, if some high potential lottery is inferior to some low potential lottery a
sequence of high potential lotteries can be constructed which converges to a low poten-
tial lottery such that each lottery in this sequence is strictly preferred to all preceding
lotteries. A potential e¤ect then leads to a drop in the utility at the limit point of the
sequence, implying that there does not exist a preference maximizing lottery for some
non-empty, compact subset of 4 (X).
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5 Games with Security- and Potential Level Players
For a …nite set of players I = f1; :::;mg let Si denote the …nite, non-empty set of pure-
strategies of player i 2 I. If a pure-strategy pro…le s 2 S = £i2ISi is played each player
i 2 I receives a deterministic payo¤ in X = fx1; :::; xng according to some outcome map
xi : S ! X. A mixed-strategy ¾i of player i 2 I is an additive probability measure
over Si, i.e., ¾i 2 4(Si), and the set of mixed-strategy pro…les, i.e., £i2I 4 (Si), is
abbreviated as 4mix (S). Throughout this paper it is assumed that every player i 2 I
may play arbitrary non-degenerated mixed-strategies by means of some appropriate
random device.
Suppose each player i 2 I resolves her uncertainty about her opponents’ mixed-
strategy choice by some additive belief ¯i with …nite support on her opponents’ mixed
strategy pro…les, i.e., ¯i 2 4fin
¡4mix (S¡i)¢ where 4fin ¡4mix (S¡i)¢ denotes the set of
all additive probability measures with …nite support on 4mix (S¡i) = £j 6=i4 (Sj). The
following de…nition includes this paper’s central assumption of how a decision maker’s
preferences over lotteries determine her preferences over mixed-strategy choices when
she is a player in some strategic situation who has a belief about the mixed-strategy
choices of her opponents.
De…nition. Let each player i 2 I have preferences over lotteries in 4 (X) repre-
sentable by some utility function Ui : 4 (X) ! R+. Then G = (4 (Si) ; Ui)i2I de-
notes a …nite game in normal form where, for all i 2 I and all (¾i; ¯i) 2 4 (Si) £
4fin ¡4mix (S¡i)¢, the utility Ui (¾i; ¯i) of choosing mixed-strategy ¾i - while believing
¯i - is given as utility Ui (¾) of choosing lottery
¾ = (¾ (x1) ¢ x1 © :::© ¾ (xn) ¢ xn) 2 4 (X)
such that, for all xk 2 X,
¾ (xk) =
X
f(si;s¡i)jxi(si;s¡i)=xkg
¾i (si)
X
¾¡i2Support( i¯ )
¯i (¾¡i) ¾¡i (s¡i) (7)
Moreover, if all players i 2 I have security- and potential level preferences over
4 (X) then G = (4 (Si) ; Ui)i2I is called a game with SL,PL-players.
Condition (7) states that if player i 2 I chooses the mixed-strategy ¾i, while she
believes ¯i, she expects to receive outcome xk with probability ¾ (xk) such that her per-
ceived probabilities of all pure-strategy pro…les (si; s¡i) giving outcome xk are summed
up. Furthermore, according to the reduction assumption for compound lotteries, player
i calculates the probability that s¡i realizes by summing up her believed probabilities
9
that mixed-strategies pro…les ¾¡i are played times the probability that s¡i realizes when
¾¡i is played.
Given G = (4 (Si) ; Ui)i2I the individual best response correspondence in mixed-
strategies of player i 2 I is de…ned as the map fi : 4fin
¡4mix (S¡i)¢ ! 24(Si) such that
fi (¯i) collects player i’s mixed-strategies that are best responses to her belief ¯i, that is
fi (¯i) = arg max4(Si)
Ui (¾i; ¯i)
For degenerated beliefs ¯i 2 4 (S¡i), assigning probability one to some mixed-strategy
pro…le ¾¡i 2 £j 6=i4(Sj), the individual best response correspondence reduces to a map
fi : 4mix (S¡i) ! 24(Si) such that fi (¾¡i) collects player i’s mixed-strategies that are
best responses to her opponents’ mixed-strategy pro…le ¾¡i.
For any game G = (4 (Si) ; Ui)i2I with SL,PL-players de…ne the game
GEU = (4 (Si) ; Vi (¢; x1; xn))i2I
that is, each lottery is evaluated by players of GEU as if it was evaluated by players of
G at the lowest security and the highest potential level, i.e., for all ¾ 2 4 (S)
Vi (¾; x1; xn) = b (x1; xn) + a (x1; xn)
nX
k=1
¾ (xk) u (xk) (8)
By construction, players of GEU are expected utility maximizers who have the same
preferences over pure-strategy pro…les as the SL,PL-players of G. A game G with SL,PL-
players is therefore identical with the according game GEU but for players’ preferences
over non-degenerated lotteries.
Recall the de…nition of a Nash equilibrium in mixed-strategies, ¾¤, of a game G =
(4 (Si) ; Ui)i2I as a …xed point of the best response correspondence f = £i2Ifi, with
fi : 4mix (S¡i)! 24(Si), i.e., ¾¤ 2 f (¾¤). Since security- and potential level preferences
satisfy monotonicity with respect to …rst order stochastic dominance it immediately
follows:
Observation 2. The pure-strategy pro…le s¤ 2 S is a Nash equilibrium of a game
G = (4 (Si) ; Ui)i2I with SL,PL-players if and only if s¤ is a Nash equilibrium of the
game GEU = (4 (Si) ; Vi (¢; x1; xn))i2I where Vi (¢; x1; xn) is de…ned by (8).
Observation 2 implies that only Nash equilibria in non-degenerated mixed-strategies
might not exist when the assumption of expected utility maximizing players is general-
ized to the assumption of SL,PL-players.
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6 Rationalizable Strategies
Equilibrium concepts, on the one hand, and rationalizability concepts, on the other hand,
represent two di¤erent approaches towards solution concepts for strategic games, i.e., of
predicting how individuals will decide in a situation of strategic interdependency. The
equilibrium approach claims that any solution has to be a Nash equilibrium such that
each player of the game chooses a strategy that is a best response against the strategies
chosen by her opponents. The rationalizability approach (Bernheim, 1984; Moulin, 1984;
Pearce, 1984) starts out with the assumption that players only choose best responses to
some belief. This assumption may e¤ectively eliminate some - unreasonable - strategies
and in a next step rationalizability requires the players to choose only best responses to
beliefs over the remaining strategy choices of her opponents. Repeating this argument
gives in the limit the set of correlated rationalizable strategies.
This process of iterated elimination of strategies which are not best responses can
be understood as a formal description of a player’s internal process of reasoning under
the epistemic assumption that it is common knowledge of the players that only best
responses are chosen (see Pearce 1984, Tan and Werlang 1988, Guesnerie 2002). Note
that every Nash equilibrium is a correlated rationalizable strategy pro…le whereas the
converse statement is not true.
De…nition. The set of correlated rationalizable mixed-strategy pro…les of a game
G = (4 (Si) ; Ui)i2I is given by R (G) =
T1
k=0 º
k such that ºk = £i2Iºki with
ºki =
[
¯i24fin(ºk¡1¡i )
fi (¯i)
and º0¡i = 4mix (S¡i).
Proposition 1. For every game G = (4(Si) ; Ui)i2I with SL,PL-players there exists
a correlated rationalizable mixed-strategy pro…le.
Remark. Existence of rationalizable strategies holds despite possible non-existence
of best responses in mixed-strategies to some beliefs caused by lower-semicontinuous
utility functions in the case of potential e¤ects. The proof of proposition 1 exploits
the fact that security- and potential level preferences satisfy monotonicity with respect
to …rst order stochastic dominance by showing that there always exist pure-strategies
among the best responses to degenerated probability-one beliefs, i.e., to pure-strategies.
For this argument to work, it is crucial that pure-strategy pro…les result in deterministic
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payo¤s. The following example shows that existence of correlated rationalizable mixed-
strategy pro…les is not any longer guaranteed for games with SL,PL-players if pure
strategy-pro…les may result in stochastic payo¤s.
Example: Suppose X = f0;1; 2g and let ¾ = (0:5 ¢ 0 © 0:5 ¢ 2) 2 4 (X). Consider
a game with two players, A and B, such that player A’s payo¤s are given as follows:
B
A
b
a1 ¾
a2 1
i.e., player A receives lottery (0:5 ¢ 0© 0:5 ¢ 2) if pure-strategy pro…le (a1; b) is played.
Let player A have security- and potential level preferences such that u (0) = 0, u (1) =
1:5, u (2) = 2, b (x; y) = 0 for all x · y, and
a (2; 2) = a (1; 2) = a(0; 2) = 1:5
a (0; 0) = a (0; 1) = a(1; 1) = 1
By a potential e¤ect, there does not exist a mixed-strategy as A’s best response to B’s
single strategy b since, for all 0 · ¸ < ¹ < 1,
UA ((1 ¡¸) ¢ ¾ © ¸ ¢ 1) < UA ((1¡ ¹) ¢ ¾ © ¹ ¢ 1)
whereas, for all 0 < ¹ < 1,
UA (1) < UA ((1 ¡ ¹) ¢ ¾ © ¹ ¢ 1)
Thus, player A’s utility strictly increases as the probability of pure strategy a1 increases
in a non-degenerated mixed-strategy. However, if strategy a1 is played with probability
one the utility sharply drops because the possibility of obtaining outcome 2 has vanished.
Obviously, there does not exist a rationalizable mixed-strategy pro…le for this game.
7 Equilibria
7.1 Equilibria in Beliefs
For a …nite game G = (4 (Si) ; Ui)i2I with utility functions Ui that are continuous on
4mix (S) and quasiconcave on 4 (Si) for all i 2 I, existence of Nash equilibria in mixed-
strategies is guaranteed by Kakutani’s …xed point theorem which establishes existence of
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a …xed point of a non-empty, convex-valued upper-hemicontinuous correspondence from
a compact and convex subset of Rn, as, e.g., 4mix (S), into its powerset. By Berge’s
maximum theorem (Berge, 1997) continuity of Ui, i 2 I, implies upper-hemicontinuity
and non-emptiness of the best-response correspondence f while quasiconcavity of Ui,
i 2 I, implies convex values of f (compare Theorem 1 in Dasgupta and Maskin, 1986).
Consequently, Nash equilibria in mixed-strategies exist in …nite gamesG = (4(Si) ; Ui)i2I
if preferences over lotteries are continuously representable by quasiconcave utility func-
tions. This existence result encompasses as special case Nash’s existence result for ex-
pected utility maximizing players (Nash, 1950a,b) while it also applies to randomization-
prone players who violate the independence axiom of expected utility theory but not the
continuity assumption.
However, as Crawford (1990) observes, if not all players are randomization-prone
then existence of Nash equilibria in mixed-strategies may fail in …nite games. As a
remedy, Crawford (1990) introduces the concept of equilibria in beliefs - for two-player
games only. He proves that there always exist equilibria in beliefs for …nite two-player
games if players’ preferences over lotteries are continuously representable. Crawford’s
existence result is quite powerful because, given a continuous utility representation, it
holds for any kind of violation of the independence axiom. In what follows I de…ne an
equilibrium in beliefs for …nite m-player games and I sketch the proof of existence.
De…nition. An equilibrium in beliefs of a game G = (4 (Si) ; Ui)i2I is an m-tupel
(°1; :::; °m) such that, for all i 2 f1; :::;mg,
(i) °i 2 4fin (4 (Si)) is the identical belief of all players j 6= i about player i’s
mixed-strategy choice and
(ii) player i’s mixed-strategies in the support of °i are best responses to her belief
¯i = £j 6=i°j.
De…ne the map gi : 4fin
¡4mix (S¡i)¢ ! 24fin(4(Si )) such that gi (¯i) collects all
…nite additive probability measures over player i’s best responses to belief ¯i, i.e.
gi (¯i) = 4fin
½
arg max
¾i24(Si)
Ui (¾i; ¯i)
¾
(9)
and call g = £i2Igi the beliefs over best-responses correspondence of gameG = (4 (Si) ; Ui)i2I.
Observation 3: °¤ 2 £i2I 4fin (4 (Si)) is an equilibrium in beliefs of game G =
(4 (Si) ; Ui)i2I if and only if °¤ is a …xed point of the beliefs over best-responses corre-
spondence, i.e., °¤ 2 g (°¤).
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By the reduction assumption for compound lotteries, i.e., 4fin (4(Si)) = 4(Si), the
beliefs over best-responses correspondence g : £i2I 4fin (4 (Si)) ! 2£i2I4fin(4(Si)) has a
…xed point if and only if g : 4mix (S) ! 24mix (S) has a …xed point. Since, by de…nition
(9), for all ¾¡i 2 4mix (S¡i) and all i 2 I, the sets gi (¾¡i) are convex closures of the sets
fi (¾¡i) the beliefs over best-responses correspondence g is convex-valued even if the best
response correspondence f is not. Thus, by Kakutani’s …xed point theorem, existence of
equilibria in beliefs in …nite games is, guaranteed for continuous utility representations
regardless whether these utility functions are quasiconcave or not.
Finally note, that existence of a Nash equilibrium in mixed-strategies implies exis-
tence of an equilibrium in beliefs whereas the converse statement is not necessarily true
unless the utility representations are quasiconcave.
7.2 A Non-Existence Result
For continuous utility representations the concept of equilibria in beliefs re-establishes
existence of equilibria by a convexicifation of the best response correspondence. Unfor-
tunately, this is not any longer the case for the discontinuous utility representations of
security- and potential level preferences.
Proposition 2. For a game G = (4 (Si) ; Ui)i2I with SL,PL-players existence of an
equilibrium in beliefs may fail if there occur security- or potential e¤ects.
The validness of this non-existence result is demonstrated by two examples of games
with SL,PL-players.
Example 1: Non-existence due to a security e¤ect. Consider the following
payo¤ matrix of a pre-emptive strike game.
B
A
de di
p 2,0 0,1
w 1,1 1,0
Specify for player A: xk 2 X , u (xk) = xk for all xk 2 X, b (x; y) = 0 for all x; y 2 X ,
and a(2; y) = a (1; y) = 2, a (0; y) = 1 for all y 2 X . Then, the best responses of A to
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beliefs ¸ ¢ de © (1¡ ¸) ¢ di with ¸ 2 [0; 1] are given as:
fwg for 0 · ¸ < 1
fpg for ¸ = 1
An equilibrium in beliefs can here only exist if B is indi¤erent between her pure-
strategies, that is, B must believe A to play her pure-strategies with equal chance.
However, by the security e¤ect, A is never indi¤erent between her pure-strategies nor
would she strictly prefer to randomize since UA is quasiconvex (observation 1).
Example 2: Non-existence due to a potential e¤ect. Consider a game with
two players, A and B, and the following payo¤ matrix:
B
A
d1 d2 d3
c1 0; 1 4; 0 0; 0
c2 3; 0 3; 1 0; 0
c3 ¡10; 0 5; 0 ¡10; 1
Specify for A: u (xk) = xk for all xk 2 X , a (x; 5) = 2 and a (x; y) = 1 for y 6= 5,
and b (x; y) = 0 for all x, y with x · y. Observe at …rst that there does not exist a
Nash equilibrium in pure-strategies. Since UA is quasiconcave (observation 1) it su¢ces
to show non-existence of a Nash equilibrium in mixed-strategies in order to demonstrate
non-existence of an equilibrium in beliefs. If there exists a Nash equilibrium in mixed-
strategies player B has to be indi¤erent between at least two of her pure-strategies3
which leaves the following four cases of possible equilibrium strategies for A
i. ¾ (c1) = ¾ (c2) = 0:5 implying that B is indi¤erent between d1 and d2
ii. ¾ (c1) = ¾ (c3) = 0:5 implying that B is indi¤erent between d1 and d3
iii. ¾ (c2) = ¾ (c3) = 0:5 implying that B is indi¤erent between d2 and d3
iv. ¾ (c1) = ¾ (c2) = ¾ (c3) = 13 implying that B is indi¤erent between d1, d2, and d3
Observe that none of these strategies is a best response to any of B’s best responses
to these strategies:
3 In general a SL,PL-player has not to be indi¤erent between pure-strategies when she prefers to ran-
domize over them. However, with only two outcomes, 0 and 1, security– and potential level preferences
reduce to expected utility preferences for player B.
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Case (i). If ¾ (c1) = ¾ (c2) = 0:5 is a best response of A she must be indi¤erent
between c1 and c2 since there is no potential e¤ect involved with these strategies. Thus,
in equilibrium B must play ¾ (d2) = 3 ¤ ¾ (d1) whereby we can obviously can exclude
¾ (d2) = ¾ (d1) = 0 since d3 is not a best response of B in case (i). But then there
does not exist a best response of A, satisfying the conditions of case (i), to any of B’s
strategies: Consider the family of mixed-strategies
¹ ¢ (0:5 ¢ c1 © 0:5 ¢ c2)© (1 ¡ ¹) ¢ c3
for 0 < ¹ · 1. For ¾ (d2) = 3¤ ¾ (d1) > 0 the utility of A is strictly increasing in ¹ as
it approaches one; but at ¹ = 1, i.e., at ¾ (c1) = ¾ (c2) = 0:5, A’s utility drops by the
potential e¤ect. An analogous argument applies to case (iv).
Case (ii). If B mixed between d1 and d3 then A strictly prefers the pure-strategy c2;
contrary to the assumption of case (ii).
Case (iii). If B mixed between d2 and d3 then A would choose c1 over c2 in the
support of any best response; contrary to the assumption of case (iii).
This establishes non-existence of an equilibrium in beliefs.
Remark. Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) present results (Theorem 2 and corollary
in Dasgupta and Maskin, 1986) which establish existence of Nash equilibria for games
with strategy sets that are compact and convex subsets of Rn under the assumption
that players have discontinuous utility functions. Their strategy is to look for conditions
guaranteeing upper-hemicontinuous best response correspondences in order to apply
Kakutani’s …xed point theorem even if Berge’s maximum theorem (Berge, 1997) is not at
hand for deriving upper-hemicontinuous best response correspondences from continuous
utility functions.
Since the mixed-strategy space, £i2I4(Si), of a …nite game is a compact and convex
subset of Rn the …ndings of Dasgupta and Maskin would immediately establish existence
of Nash equilibria in mixed-strategies for …nite games with SL,PL-players if the discon-
tinuous utility representations for SL,PL-players satis…ed the according assumptions.
Besides graph-continuity (see de…nition 3 in Dasgupta and Maskin,1986), Dasgupta and
Maskin’s existence results presume upper-semicontinuous utility functions that are qua-
siconcave in a player’s strategy choice. However, by observation 1, upper-semicontinuity
and quasiconcavity of the utility functions can not be simultaneously satis…ed when
there occur potential- or security e¤ects.
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7.3 A Limited Existence Result
For the special case that there do not occur security e¤ects, a limited existence result
for Nash equilibria in mixed-strategies of games G = (4(Si) ; Ui)i2I with SL,PL-players
can be established. The key assumption for this existence result refers to the occurrence
of so-called high-potential pure-strategies in an equilibrium mixed-strategy pro…le of
game GEU = (4 (Si) ; Vi (¢; x1; xn))i2I. More speci…cally, consider a pure-strategy ti 2 Si
which appears in the support of mixed strategy ¾mixi such that the mixed-strategy pro…le¡
¾mixi ; ¾
mix¡i
¢
is a Nash equilibrium of GEU = (4 (Si) ; Vi (¢; x1; xn))i2I. Call ti a high-
potential pure-strategy if there do not occur discontinuous downward jumps in the utility
representation when some sequence of high potential level lotteries approaches lottery¡
ti; ¾mix¡i
¢ 2 4 (x; y), i.e., for all ¹y ¸ y,
b (x; ¹y) = b (x; y) and a (x; ¹y) = a (x; y)
Proposition 3. Given a game G = (4 (Si) ; Ui)i2I with SL,PL-players such that no
security e¤ects occur. If there exists a Nash equilibrium ¾mix of GEU = (4 (Si) ; Vi (¢; x1; xn))i2I,
where Vi (¢; x1; xn) is de…ned by (8), such that, for all players i 2 I, a high-potential
pure-strategy ti 2 Si appears in the support of ¾mixi then ¾mix is also a Nash equilibrium
of G.
Proposition 3 establishes existence of Nash equilibria for strategic situations where
Kakutani’s …xed point theorem is not applicable since potential e¤ects entail non-existence
of some best responses. Example 1 of the preceding subsection demonstrates that there
does not exist an analogous result for security e¤ects. Moreover, example 2 shows that
the assumptions of proposition 3 can not be generalized to mixed-strategy Nash equi-
libria of GEU such that these equilibria have no high-potential pure-strategy in their
support: key to the non-existence result for game G of example 2 is the fact that A’s
(high potential) strategy c3 does not belong to the support of any equilibrium strategy
of game GEU .
As an immediate consequence of proposition 3, a Nash equilibrium exists for a game
G with SL,PL-players if there do not occur security e¤ects and if all pure-strategy pro…les
appear in the support of a mixed-strategy Nash equilibrium of game GEU. Finally note,
that proposition 3 and observation 2 imply existence of Nash equilibria in 2 £ 2-player
games with SL,PL-players if there do not occur security e¤ects.
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8 Trembling Hand Perfect Equilibria and Proper
Equilibria
Proposition 2 implies possible non-existence of Nash equilibria for games with SL,PL-
players. However, as this section demonstrates, for games with SL,PL-players there
always exist trembling hand perfect equilibria (Selten, 1975) and proper equilibria (My-
erson, 1978). Denote by 4" (Si) ½ 4 (Si) a set of mixed-strategies such that each si 2 Si
appears in the support of ¾i 2 4" (Si) with probability ¾i (si) ¸ " (si) > 0, and call
G (") = (4" (Si) ; Ui)i2I a perturbed game.
De…nition (Selten, 1975): The mixed-strategy pro…le ¾¤ = £i2I¾¤i is a trembling
hand perfect equilibrium of G if there is a sequence
©
"k
ª
k2N, limk!1 "
k (si) = 0 for all
si 2 Si and all i 2 I, such that ¾¤ = limk!1 ¾¤
¡
"k
¢
where ¾¤
¡
"k
¢
is a Nash equilibrium
of the perturbed game G
¡
"k
¢
.
Proposition 4. There exists for every game G = (4 (Si) ; Ui)i2I with SL,PL-players
a trembling hand perfect equilibrium. Moreover, ¾¤ is a trembling hand perfect equi-
librium of G if and only if ¾¤ is a trembling hand perfect equilibrium of GEU =
(4 (Si) ; Vi (¢; x1;xn))i2I where Vi (¢; x1; xn) is de…ned by (8).
Proposition 4 is easily derived. For every perturbed game G(") SL,PL-players behave
like expected utility maximizers: since every outcome realizes with positive probability
all relevant mixed-strategy pro…les have the worst security level x1 and the best potential
level xn. As a consequence, there exists a Nash equilibrium in mixed-strategies for
every perturbed game G
¡
"k
¢
, and the result obtains because any limit point of Nash
equilibria for some sequence of perturbed games is, by de…nition, a trembling hand
perfect equilibrium of GEU.
Obviously, the same argumentation applies to the proper equilibrium of Myerson
(1978) who imposes particular restrictions on the probability weights "(si) by which pure
strategies si may be played in a so-called "-proper equilibrium ¾0 (") of G. In particular, it
is required for an "-proper equilibrium ¾ 0 (") of G that 0 < " (ti) = ¾0i (ti) · " (si) ¤" (si)
if Ui
¡
ti; ¾0¡i (")
¢
< Ui
¡
si; ¾ 0¡i (")
¢
. A proper equilibrium of G is then de…ned as a
limit point ¾0 = limk!1 ¾0
¡
"k
¢
where each ¾ 0
¡
"k
¢
is an "-proper equilibrium of G and
limk!1 "k (si) = 0 for all si 2 Si and all i 2 I. Analogously, a proper equilibrium of G
is given by any proper equilibrium of GEU; which actually exists (Myerson, 1978; van
Damme, 1991).
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Note that the concepts of trembling hand perfect equilibria or of proper equilibria
are not any longer selection - perfectness - criteria for Nash equilibria in games with
SL,PL-players. For example, the unique trembling hand perfect equilibrium ¾¤ in the
pre-emptive strike game of example 1 is given by ¾¤A (p) =
1
2 and ¾
¤
B (de) =
1
2. But, as
example 1 shows, this mixed-strategy pro…le is not a Nash equilibrium. In my opinion,
trembling hand perfect equilibria or proper equilibria that are not Nash equilibria are
meaningless as strategic solutions except players actually play a slightly perturbed game
G (") such that the analyst does not know the exact value of ". This analyst could
then regard a trembling hand perfect equilibrium of G as a good approximation for the
unknown Nash equilibrium of the actually played game G (").
Remark. Cohen’s model of security- and potential level preferences only deviates
from expected utility theory if the probability of a bad or a good outcome drops to
zero whereas Selten’s assumption of trembles prevents exactly this to happen. Both
approaches stand for con‡icting ideas of how a decision maker perceives her in‡uence on
the possibility of outcomes. While Selten presumes a decision maker who believes that,
independently of her own choice, anything may happen anyway, it is crucial for Cohen’s
decision maker that she may either exclude or include by her own choice the possibility
of particular outcomes.
Finally note, that trembling hand perfect equilibria do not necessarily exist for
security- and potential level preferences with thresholds as introduced in Schmidt and
Zimper (2003). Discontinuities due to security- or potential e¤ects may there already
occur for small probabilities of bad or good outcomes such that the above limit point
argument, establishing existence of trembling hand perfect equilibria, is not at hand.
9 Concluding Remarks
From an applicational point of view, rationalizability concepts have the practical disad-
vantage of being weaker solution concepts than equilibrium concepts, that is, any Nash
equilibrium is rationalizable whereas the converse statement is not true. The results
of this paper contribute to the comparison of di¤erent strategic solution concepts for
strategic games by demonstrating that this seeming disadvantage of rationalizability
may become an advantage for games with players who have security- and potential level
preferences: On the one hand, there are strategic situations such that not all security-
and potential level players can choose best responses and simultaneously have correct
beliefs about their opponents’ strategy choices. On the other hand, there always exist
rationalizable strategies such that a security- and potential level player may choose her
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strategy via strategically sophisticated reasoning despite non-existence of equilibria.
10 Appendix: Proofs
Proof of proposition 1: Fix some point-belief ¯i (s¡i) = 1 and pick a pure strategy si that is
preference-maximizing over Si, i.e., si 2 arg maxti2Si Ui (ti; ¯ i), whereby …niteness of Si guarantees
the existence of si . Suppose now there exists some mixed-strategy ¾i 2 4 (Si) such that Ui (¾i ; ¯i) >
Ui (si; ¯i). But this is impossible:
Since ¹x = xi (si; s¡i) is the maximal element in the support of any lottery (¾i; ¯i) with ¯i (s¡i) = 1,
for all ¾i 2 4 (Si), the lotteries (¾i ; ¯i) belong to some subset 4 (x; y) such that x · ¹x and y · ¹x.
Implying for security- and potential level preferences
Ui (si; ¯i) = Vi (1 ¢ ¹x; ¹x; ¹x)
¸ Vi (¾i ; ¯i; ¹x; ¹x) ¸ Vi (¾i; ¯i ; x; y) = Ui (¾i; ¯ i)
for all ¾i 2 4 (Si). Thus, si is a best response on 4 (Si) to the point-belief ¯i (s¡i) = 1.
As a consequence the set of so-called point-rationalizable strategies is non-empty which implies
non-emptiness of R (G).¤
Proof of proposition 3: If
¡
¾mixi ; ¾
mix¡i
¢
is a Nash equilibrium of GEU then, for any pure-strategy
si 2 Si belonging to the support of ¾mixi ,
Vi (si ; ¾¡i ; x1; xn) = Vi
¡
¾mixi ; ¾¡i ; x1; xn
¢
(10)
implying, for all x; y 2 X ,
Vi (si ; ¾¡i; x; y) = Vi
¡
¾mixi ; ¾¡i ; x; y
¢
(11)
Let ti be a high-potential pure-strategy belonging to the support of ¾mixi . Since, by assumption, only
potential e¤ects may occur equality (10) implies, for all ¾i 2 4 (Si),
Ui
¡
ti; ¾
mix
¡i
¢ ¸ Ui ¡¾i ; ¾mix¡i ¢
Thus, ¾mixi is a best response to ¾
mix¡i of player i in game G if and only if
Ui
¡
ti; ¾
mix¡i
¢ · Ui ¡¾mixi ; ¾mix¡i ¢
This is satis…ed by equation (11) because lottery
¡
¾mixi ; ¾
mix¡i
¢
has at least the potential level of lottery¡
ti; ¾
mix¡i
¢
since ti appears in the support of ¾mixi .¤
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